Low Intensity Warfare Counterinsurgency Proinsurgency And Antiterrorism In The Eighties

This edition of the U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy continues to reflect the structure and approach of the core national security strategy and policy curriculum at the War College. The fourth edition is published in two volumes that correspond roughly to the Department of National Security and Strategy's core courses: "Theory of War and Strategy" and "National Security Policy and Strategy." Like previous editions, this one is largely an expansion of its predecessor rather than a major rewriting. About a quarter of the chapters are new, and several others have undergone significant rewrites or updates. However, approximately half of the book remains unchanged. Although this is not primarily a textbook, it does reflect both the method and manner we use to teach strategy formulation to America's future senior leaders. The book is not a comprehensive or exhaustive treatment of either strategic theory or the policymaking process. Both volumes are organized to proceed from the general to the specific. Thus the first volume opens with general thoughts on the nature and theory of war and strategy, proceeds to look at the complex aspect of power, and concludes with specific theoretical issues. Similarly, the second volume begins by examining the policy/strategy process, moves to a look at the strategic environment, and concludes with some specific issues. This edition adds several short case studies that can be used to illustrate the primary material in the volume.

There is currently much discussion regarding the causes of terrorist acts, as well as the connection between terrorism and religion. Terrorism is attributed either to religious 'fanaticism' or, alternately, to political and economic factors, with religion more or less dismissed as a secondary factor. The Cambridge Companion to Religion and Terrorism examines this complex relationship between religion and terrorism phenomenon through a collection of essays freshly written for this volume. Bringing varying approaches, from the theoretical to the empirical, to the topic, the Companion includes an array of subjects, such as radicalization, suicide bombing, and rational choice, as well as specific case studies. The result is a richly textured collection that prompts readers to critically consider the cluster of phenomena that we have come to refer to as 'terrorism,' and terrorism's relationship with the similarly problematic set of phenomena that we call 'religion.'

Explores the intermingling of women's bodies and nations' boundaries

This new work features the fresh thinking of twenty-eight leading authors from a variety of military and national security disciplines. Following an introduction by Lt. Gen. James Dubik, Commander I Corps, U.S. Army, and an opening essay titled "State of the Question" by Dr. Colin Gray, the anthology first considers the general question of "An American Way of War?" Sections on operational art, with writers addressing the issues in both conventional and small wars; stability and reconstruction; and intelligence complete the volume. Among the well-known contributors are Fred Kagan, Ralph Peters, Harlan Ullman, and Milan Vego. This collection of essays is the outcome of a seminar series sponsored by the Office of Force Transformation and the U.S. Navy to examine the future of warfare and the underlying principles of war and to educate future military strategists and leaders on these principles. Footnotes, index, and a
bibliographic essay make the work a useful tool for students of war and general readers alike.

The Global Arms Trade is a timely, comprehensive and in-depth study of this topic, a phenomenon which has continued to flourish despite the end of the Cold War and the preoccupation with global terrorism after 11 September 2001. It provides a clear description and analysis of the demand for, and supply of, modern weapons systems, and assess key issues of concern. This book will be especially useful to scholars, policy analysts, those in the arms industry, defence professionals, students of international relations and security studies, media professionals, government officials, and those generally interested in the arms trade.

The rise and fall of the Cold War coincided with the universalization and consolidation of the modern nation-state as the key unit of the wider international system. A key characteristic of the post-Cold War era, in which the US has emerged as the sole superpower, is the growing number of collapsing or collapsed states. A growing number of states are, or have become, mired in conflict or civil war, the antecedents of which are often to be found in the late-colonial and Cold War era. At the same time, US foreign policy (and the actions of other organizations such as the United Nations) may well be compounding state failure in the context of the post-9/11 Global War on Terror (GWOT) or what is also increasingly referred to as the ‘Long War’. The Long War is often represented as a ‘new’ era in warfare and geopolitics. This book acknowledges that the Long War is new in important respects, but it also emphasizes that the Long War bears many similarities to the Cold War. A key similarity is the way in which insurgency and counterinsurgency were and continue to be seen primarily in the context of inter-state rivalry in which the critical local or regional dynamics of revolution and counter-revolution are marginalized or neglected. In this context American policy-makers and their allies have again erroneously applied a ‘grand strategy’ that suits the imperatives of conventional military and geo-political thinking rather than engaging with what are a much more variegated array of problems facing the changing global order. This book provides a collection of well-integrated studies that shed light on the history and future of insurgency, counterinsurgency and collapsing states in the context of the Long War. This book was previously published as a special issue of Third World Quarterly.

In a substantial new afterword to his classic account of the collapse of American triumphalism in the wake of World War II, Tom Engelhardt carries that story into the twenty-first century. He explores how, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the younger George Bush headed for the Wild West (Osama bin Laden, Wanted, Dead or Alive); how his administration brought victory culture roaring back as part of its Global War on Terror and its rush to invade Saddam Hussein's Iraq; and how, from its Mission Accomplished moment on, its various stories of triumph crashed and burned in that land.

Among Africa's suffering is the little-known war in Mozambique, now in its second decade. Finnegan traveled through the country in 1988 to assess the impact of a war waged by guerrillas who are armed and often directed by South Africa. He tells a compelling story of rural misery caused by the war, which in turn offers a fertile ground for its continuation. Finnegan's narrative includes historical background and critical analysis of the Mozambique government whose policies have not created an inclusive
framework for the nation. Finnegan is drawn to the conclusion that Mozambique’s peasants long have been denied the fruits of peace: first under centuries of Portuguese colonialism; and now as they are exposed to the current war that is destroying their future.

This book examines the long, complex experience of American involvement in irregular warfare. It begins with the American Revolution in 1776 and chronicles big and small irregular wars for the next two and a half centuries. What is readily apparent in dirty wars is that failure is painfully tangible while success is often amorphous. Successfully fighting these wars often entails striking a critical balance between military victory and politics. America’s status as a democracy only serves to make fighting - and, to a greater degree, winning - these irregular wars even harder. Rather than futilely insisting that Americans should not or cannot fight this kind of irregular war, Russell Crandall argues that we would be better served by considering how we can do so as cleanly and effectively as possible.

This book maps the increasing convergence of US domestic and international security regimes, analyzing the trend towards global pacification in the name of ‘security’. The dream of liberal world peace after the Cold War is on the verge of collapsing into permanent global pacification - not only in the global south but also in pockets of the ‘Third World’ within the territory of Western states. In this volume, the author explores the ways in which regimes of security have been extended into increasingly large aspects of social life and shows that their expansion has been driven by a constant broadening of the notion of ‘war’. Filling a gap in the literature, the book demonstrates how US security agencies have sought to develop indeterminate security capabilities aimed at distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate flows of people and resources. This analysis of regimes of security is tied to a more general discussion about the persistence, or even multiplication, of illiberal forms of power within liberal governmentality. This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, war and conflict studies and international relations in general.

This timely collection of original essays examines the global link between democratic development and political terrorism, delving into the difficult questions, challenges, far-reaching consequences, and uncertainties of dealing with terrorism on an international scale.

What could be more American than Columbus Day? Or the Washington Redskins? For Native Americans, they are bitter reminders that they live in a world where their identity is still fodder for white society. "The law has always been used as toilet paper by the status quo where American Indians are concerned," writes Ward Churchill in Acts of Rebellion, a collection of his most important writings from the past twenty years. Vocal and incisive, Churchill stands at the forefront of American Indian concerns, from land issues to the American Indian Movement, from government repression to the history of genocide. Churchill, one of the most respected writers on Native American issues, lends a strong and radical voice to the American Indian cause. Acts of Rejection shows how the most basic civil rights’ laws put into place to aid all Americans failed miserably, and continue to fail, when put into practice for our indigenous brothers and sisters. Seeking to convey what has been done to Native North America, Churchill skillfully dissects Native Americans’ struggles for property and freedom, their resistance and repression, cultural issues, and radical Indian ideologies.
Volume II continues the analyses and discussion of national security policy and strategy. With its impressive breadth of coverage – both geographically and chronologically – the International Encyclopedia of Military History is the most up-to-date and inclusive A-Z resource on military history. From uniforms and military insignia worn by combatants to the brilliant military leaders and tacticians who commanded them, the campaigns and wars to the weapons and equipment used in them, this international and multi-cultural two-volume set is an accessible resource combining the latest scholarship in the field with a world perspective on military history.

A definitive account of the American experience in Afghanistan from the rise of the Taliban to the depths of the insurgency. After the swift defeat of the Taliban in 2001, American optimism has steadily evaporated in the face of mounting violence; a new “war of a thousand cuts” has now brought the country to its knees. In the Graveyard of Empires is a political history of Afghanistan in the “Age of Terror” from 2001 to 2009, exploring the fundamental tragedy of America’s longest war since Vietnam. After a brief survey of the great empires in Afghanistan—the campaigns of Alexander the Great, the British in the era of Kipling, and the late Soviet Union—Seth G. Jones examines the central question of our own war: how did an insurgency develop? Following the September 11 attacks, the United States successfully overthrew the Taliban regime. It established security throughout the country—killing, capturing, or scattering most of al Qa’ida’s senior operatives—and Afghanistan finally began to emerge from more than two decades of struggle and conflict. But Jones argues that as early as 2001 planning for the Iraq War siphoned off resources and talented personnel, undermining the gains that had been made. After eight years, he says, the United States has managed to push al Qa’ida’s headquarters about one hundred miles across the border into Pakistan, the distance from New York to Philadelphia. While observing the tense and often adversarial relationship between NATO allies in the Coalition, Jones—who has distinguished himself at RAND and was recently named by Esquire as one of the “Best and Brightest” young policy experts—introduces us to key figures on both sides of the war. Harnessing important new research and integrating thousands of declassified government documents, Jones then analyzes the insurgency from a historical and structural point of view, showing how a rising drug trade, poor security forces, and pervasive corruption undermined the Karzai government, while Americans abandoned a successful strategy, failed to provide the necessary support, and allowed a growing sanctuary for insurgents in Pakistan to catalyze the Taliban resurgence. Examining what has worked thus far—and what has not—this serious and important book underscores the challenges we face in stabilizing the country and explains where we went wrong and what we must do if the United States is to avoid the disastrous fate that has befallen many of the great world powers to enter the region.

A penetrating analysis of the controversial U.S. role in the 1990 Nicaraguan elections—the most closely monitored in history—this book exposes the intervention in the electoral process of a sovereign nation by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the National Endowment for Democracy, and private U.S.-based organizations.

Eight foreign policy experts analyze the expanding role of the United States government in pro-insurgency, counter-insurgency, and anti-terrorist programs around the world.
This volume brings together an impressive collection of important works covering nearly every aspect of early Native American history, from contact and exchange to diplomacy, religion, warfare, and disease. Benjamin A. Valentino finds that ethnic hatreds or discrimination, undemocratic systems of government, and dysfunctions in society play a much smaller role in mass killing and genocide than is commonly assumed. He shows that the impetus for mass killing usually originates from a relatively small group of powerful leaders and is often carried out without the active support of broader society. Mass killing, in his view, is a brutal political or military strategy designed to accomplish leaders' most important objectives, counter threats to their power, and solve their most difficult problems. In order to capture the full scope of mass killing during the twentieth century, Valentino does not limit his analysis to violence directed against ethnic groups, or to the attempt to destroy victim groups as such, as do most previous studies of genocide. Rather, he defines mass killing broadly as the intentional killing of a massive number of noncombatants, using the criteria of 50,000 or more deaths within five years as a quantitative standard. Final Solutions focuses on three types of mass killing: communist mass killings like the ones carried out in the Soviet Union, China, and Cambodia; ethnic genocides as in Armenia, Nazi Germany, and Rwanda; and "counter-guerrilla" campaigns including the brutal civil war in Guatemala and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Valentino closes the book by arguing that attempts to prevent mass killing should focus on disarming and removing from power the leaders and small groups responsible for instigating and organizing the killing. Perilous Options examines the use and misuse of special operations through an in-depth analysis of four operations--the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Sontay raid to rescue POWs in North Vietnam, the Mayaguez operation, and the Iran hostage rescue mission. It identifies recurrent problems and suggests changes that can improve the success rate of these operations in the future. After a decade and a half of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, US policymakers are seeking to provide aid and advice to local governments' counterinsurgency campaigns rather than directly intervening with US forces. This strategy, and US counterinsurgency doctrine in general, fail to recognize that despite a shared aim of defeating an insurgency, the US and its local partner frequently have differing priorities with respect to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Without some degree of reform or policy change on the part of the insurgency-plagued government, American support will have a limited impact. Using three detailed case studies - the Hukbalahap Rebellion in the Philippines, Vietnam during the rule of Ngo Dinh Diem, and the Salvadorian Civil War - Ladwig demonstrates that providing significant amounts of aid will not generate sufficient leverage to affect a client's behaviour and policies. Instead, he argues that influence flows from pressure and tight conditions on aid rather than from boundless generosity. President George W. Bush maintained in his address of 20 September 2001, that the successful prosecution of the war against terrorism will require the judicious use of 'every resource at our command - every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war'. Unlike the Cold War, the War on Terrorism is neither a battle against some ideology nor bounded by physical boundaries or conventional political units such as nation-states. The War on Terrorism is the internationalisation, or rather, globalisation of previous wars. Terror is not a nation, and the enemies in such wars are not nations; any regime such as Libya simply by repudiating terrorism, can become an ally of the anti-terror coalition. Regimes that continue to practice terrorism against domestic opponents qualify to participate in the wider war if they conform to certain norms in external affairs. The 28 articles reprinted here consider aspects of that most amorphous of animals - the War on Terrorism. They do not set out to provide all of the answers; nor do they radiate a unified vision of what constitutes the war on terrorism; the
pieces begin from a range of political and intellectual outlooks. Taken as a group, however, the difficulties of determining the limits and nature of the war on terrorism receive important attention. The authors address several major themes within the war on terrorism: what falls within its perimeters, its shifting manifestations, implications, responses and future directions. The author argues that insurgency is mutating in response to changes in the global security environment, thus making much of U.S. strategy and doctrine obsolete. Even though counterinsurgency is not currently a high priority in U.S. national security policy, the military must keep abreast of such changes and preserve some expertise so that American capability could be reconstituted should policymakers again opt for active counterinsurgency support. He states that if the military ignores global developments in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more difficult.

Depicts U.S. political leaders as the consistent driving force behind America's Vietnam commitment.

In Violence Work Micol Seigel offers a new theorization of the quintessential incarnation of state power: the police. Foregrounding the interdependence of policing, the state, and global capital, Seigel redefines policing as "violence work," showing how it is shaped by its role of channeling state violence. She traces this dynamic by examining the formation, demise, and aftermath of the U.S. State Department's Office of Public Safety (OPS), which between 1962 and 1974 specialized in training police forces internationally. Officially a civilian agency, the OPS grew and operated in military and counterinsurgency realms in ways that transgressed the borders that are meant to contain the police within civilian, public, and local spheres. Tracing the career paths of OPS agents after their agency closed, Seigel shows how police practices writ large are rooted in violence—especially against people of color, the poor, and working people—and how understanding police as a civilian, public, and local institution legitimizes state violence while preserving the myth of state benevolence.

This book is a critical exploration of the war on terror from the prism of armed drones and globalization. It is particularly focused on the United States' use of the drones, and the systemic dysfunctions that globalization has caused to international political economy and national security, creating backlash in which the desirability of globalization is not only increasingly questioned, but the resultant dissension about its desirability appears increasingly militating against the international consensus needed to fight the war on terror. To underline the controversial nature of the "war on terror" and the pragmatic weapon (armed drones) fashioned for its prosecution, some of the elements of this controversy have been interrogated in this book. They include, amongst others, the doubt over whether the war should have been declared in the first place because terrorist attacks hardly meet the United Nations’ casus belli – an armed attack. There are critics, as highlighted in this book, who believe that the "war on terror" is not an armed conflict properly so called, and, thus, remains only a "law enforcement issue." The United States and all the states taking part in the war on terror are obligated to observe International Humanitarian Law (IHL). It is within this context of IHL that this book appraises the drone as a weapon of engagement, discussing such issues as "personality" and "signature" strikes as well as the implications of the deployment of spies as drone strikers rather than the Defence Department, the members of the U.S armed forces. This book will be of value to researchers, academics, policymakers, professionals, and students in the fields of security studies, terrorism, the law of armed conflict, international humanitarian law, and international politics.
This book demonstrates how Clausewitzian thought influenced American strategic thinking between the Vietnam War and the current conflict in Iraq. Carl von Clausewitz’s thought played a part in the process of military reform and the transition in US policy that took place after the Vietnam War. By the time of the 1991 Gulf War, American policy makers demonstrated that they understood the Clausewitzian notion of utilizing military force to fulfil a clear political objective. The US armed forces bridged the operational and strategic levels during that conflict in accordance with Clausewitz’s conviction that war plans should be tailored to fulfil a political objective. With the end of the Cold War, and an increasing predilection for technological solutions, American policy makers and the military moved away from Clausewitz. It was only the events of 11 September 2001 that reminded Americans of his intrinsic value. However, while many aspects of the ‘War on Terror’ and the conflict in Iraq can be accommodated within the Clausewitzian paradigm, the lack of a clear policy for countering insurgency in Iraq suggests that the US may have returned full circle to the flawed strategic approach evident in Vietnam. Clausewitz and America will be of great interest to students of strategy, military history, international security and US politics. By their nature, democracies clearly have greater constraints than autocratic regimes on their freedom of action as they have to meet constitutional, legal and moral criteria in their use of force. This collection analyses a number of case studies showing how democracies have won small wars.

Strives to make low-intensity conflict more understandable, as it poses important problems for American interests and policy. The U.S. will better secure its own interests only when it has developed a flexible capacity to deal with the root causes of conflicts around the world. Discusses the Middle East, Afghanistan, Guatemala and El Salvador, Africa, the Philippines and Indonesia.

This collection of essays by Kim Scipes explores efforts to build global labor solidarity from the bottom up through analyses of the KMU Labor Center of the Philippines, AFL-CIO foreign policy, and contemporary initiatives.—Gene Bruskin, Co-founder, US Labor Against the War

British forces conducted operations short of war in Northern Ireland for twenty-five years, yet they were unable to defeat the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). In this heretofore unpublished dissertation from 1994, McFate identifies how certain cultural, legal, and political factors contributed to the longevity of violence in Northern Ireland. Viewing counterinsurgency as a self-reproducing cultural system with its own complex logic, McFate argues that limitations on violence prescribed by the counterinsurgency principle of minimum force paradoxically resulted in a very high degree of sustainability of conflict. Certain other factors—such as emergency security legislation, reverence of military competence, and geo-strategic compression of violence within a cordon sanitaire—enabled normalization and reproduction of the conflict. In opposition to this order, the 1981 Republican hungerstrikes used the silence of the body to incriminate the state, ‘embodying’ a resistance to the war system of counterinsurgency.

Learning to Forget analyzes the evolution of US counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine over the last five decades. Beginning with an extensive section on the lessons of Vietnam, it traces the decline of COIN in the 1970s, then the rebirth of low intensity conflict through the Reagan years, in the conflict in Bosnia, and finally in the campaigns
of Iraq and Afghanistan. Ultimately it closes the loop by explaining how, by confronting the lessons of Vietnam, the US Army found a way out of those most recent wars. In the process it provides an illustration of how military leaders make use of history and demonstrates the difficulties of drawing lessons from the past that can usefully be applied to contemporary circumstances. The book outlines how the construction of lessons is tied to the construction of historical memory and demonstrates how histories are constructed to serve the needs of the present. In so doing, it creates a new theory of doctrinal development.

Confronting insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has recognized the need to “re-learn” counterinsurgency. But how has the Department of Defense with its mixed efforts responded to this new strategic environment? Has it learned anything from past failures? In The New Counterinsurgency Era, David Ucko examines DoD’s institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance—all while stabilizing conquered territory and engaging with local populations. After briefly surveying the history of American counterinsurgency operations, Ucko focuses on measures the military has taken since 2001 to relearn old lessons about counterinsurgency, to improve its ability to conduct stability operations, to change the institutional bias against counterinsurgency, and to account for successes gained from the learning process. Given the effectiveness of insurgent tactics, the frequency of operations aimed at building local capacity, and the danger of ungoverned spaces acting as havens for hostile groups, the military must acquire new skills to confront irregular threats in future wars. Ucko clearly shows that the opportunity to come to grips with counterinsurgency is matched in magnitude only by the cost of failing to do so.

Preclassical and indigenous nonwestern military institutions and methods of warfare are the chief subjects of this annotated bibliography of works published 1967–1997. Emphasis is on historical studies of military organization and the relationships between military and other social institutions.

Keith B. Bickel challenges a host of military and strategic theories that treat particular bureaucratic structures, large organizations, and elites as the progenitors of doctrine. This timely study of how the military draws lessons from interventions focuses on the overlooked role that mid-level combat officers play in creating military doctrine. Mars Learning closely evaluates Marine civil and military pacification operations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, and illuminates the debates surrounding the development of Marine Corps' small wars doctrine between 1915 and 1940. The result is compelling evidence of how field experience obtained before 1940 played a role in shaping the Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual and elements of doctrine that exist today. How the Marines organized lessons at that time provides important insights into how doctrine is likely to be generated today in response to post-Cold War interventions around the globe.

This copiously illustrated A-Z reference presents the most in-depth information available about the various conflicts the world has endured, local, regional, and international, since World War II. Some 142 conflicts are discussed and analyzed. The Encyclopedia of Conflict since World War II, with its coverage of all the countries of the world, fills a critical need for clear, comprehensive explanations of events not covered in such detail in any other reference source. Entries end with an extensive bibliography; and the encyclopedia includes maps, chronologies, and a general bibliography, as well as an index designed to make the reader understand the correlation and relationships between individual conflicts.
Let's begin with the basics: violence is an inherent part of policing. The police represent the most direct means by which the state imposes its will on the citizenry. They are armed, trained, and authorized to use force. Like the possibility of arrest, the threat of violence is implicit in every police encounter. Violence, as well as the law, is what they represent. Using media reports alone, the Cato Institute’s last annual study listed nearly seven thousand victims of police "misconduct" in the United States. But such stories of police brutality only scratch the surface of a national epidemic. Every year, tens of thousands are framed, blackmailed, beaten, sexually assaulted, or killed by cops. Hundreds of millions of dollars are spent on civil judgments and settlements annually. Individual lives, families, and communities are destroyed. In this extensively revised and updated edition of his seminal study of policing in the United States, Kristian Williams shows that police brutality isn't an anomaly, but is built into the very meaning of law enforcement in the United States. From antebellum slave patrols to today's unarmed youth being gunned down in the streets, "peace keepers" have always used force to shape behavior, repress dissent, and defend the powerful. Our Enemies in Blue is a well-researched page-turner that both makes historical sense of this legalized social pathology and maps out possible alternatives. Kristian Williams is the author of several books, including American Methods: Torture and the Logic of Domination. He co-edited Life During Wartime: Resisting Counterinsurgency, and lives in Portland, Oregon.

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